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This book bridges the divide between formal and quantitative studies of deterrence by empirically testing and extending perfect deterrence theory. The author focuses on general deterrence, which relates to managing relations between states at all times, not only during crises. This distinction is important because understanding general deterrence is more important than understanding immediate deterrence, and because empirical analyses of immediate deterrence can be misleading due to selection effects. In a series of formal and quantitative analyses, the author tests perfect deterrence theory, applies the theory to explain recurrent conflict, and develops a new three-party game of extended deterrence.